








Linking Ideas to Outcomes: A Response 
It is a distinct pleasure to have the chance to respond to the insightful 
commentaries of Peter Drahos, Ruth Okediji, and Tomiko Brown-Nagin. I 
find much to agree with in each, but I will focus on a few areas of divergence in 
the hope of clarifying our differences. 
Drahos’s work on the role of ideas in the field of international intellectual 
property (IP) has been essential to my own thinking, and we agree on two 
critical points: that frame mobilization matters to political outcomes, and that 
frame mobilization is not all that matters.1  But Drahos and I disagree on how 
framing matters, because we employ slightly different conceptions of the term. 
As Drahos’s reference to Cicero suggests, he treats framing as primarily a form 
of rhetorical intervention, one that can usually yield only symbolic or interim 
victories.2  I intend the concept in a more constitutive way, as it has been 
developed in the social movements literature. Framing here marks acts of 
dialogic, emergent interpretation that instigate, legitimate, and sustain 
collective action.3  Conceived of in this way, frames are not only rhetorical 
devices. They are also fundamental to the dynamics of collective action–to the 
very possibility and nature of “the environmental movement” or the “access to 
knowledge movement,” or even, I contend, the “IP industries.”4 
 
1.  Peter Drahos, Does Dialogue Make a Difference?  Structural Change and the Limits of Framing, 
117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 268, 270, 272 (2008), 
http://yalelawjournal.org/2008/06/01/drahos.html; Amy Kapczynski, The Access to 
Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804, 815 
(2008). We even agree that one could retrofit public choice accounts of the field of IP to 
better explain the A2K mobilization.  Id. at 841 n.174. But as I have noted, I am skeptical of 
the attempt to include ideational elements in public choice accounts.  Id. at 811 n.6. 
2.  Drahos, supra note 1, at 268, 272. 
3.  Kapczynski, supra note 1, at 813-16. 
4.  Kapczynski, supra note 1, at 842-51. 
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According to Drahos’s more rhetorical conception of framing, frames are 
derivative and instrumental, and so rely heavily on external forces such as crises 
and already-existing mass publics to gain traction.5 I would say instead that 
there is a complex and mutually constitutive relationship between crises, mass 
publics, collective action, and framing. Take an example offered by Drahos, 
that of the nuclear accident at Three Mile Island. The near meltdown of this 
Pennsylvania reactor did serve as a rallying point for the public, but, as social 
movement scholars have demonstrated, only because the decade-old anti-
nuclear movement and several local anti-nuclear organizations provided the 
frameworks, expertise, and organizing capacity needed to turn the event into a 
“crisis.”6  Alternative frames were available. The event could have been fit 
(though not easily) into the competing “progress” frame of nuclear power, by 
arguing that it demonstrated the reliability of nuclear safety systems because a 
major accident was averted.7  Activists also had to work against arguments 
from experts that the accident posed no detectable health risks for the average 
person; in retrospect there is no consensus that it did.8 Compare this to the 
spill of 100 million gallons of toxic uranium sludge in New Mexico that 
occurred a few months later. That accident (which occurred on Navajo land) 
and the Three Mile Island incident were of “comparable magnitude,” but the 
New Mexico spill never was perceived as the same kind of crisis.9 The point is 
not that events and existing publics do not matter, but that they do not carry 
with them their own meanings or necessary forms of organization. 
The constitutive account of collective action framing is appealing precisely 
because it provides an account of the link between acts of interpretation and 
political mobilization, and thus between ideas and political outcomes. My 
claim is not that “webs of dialogue are more important than webs of 
coercion,”10 but rather that it is not easy to neatly separate the two—
 
5.  Drahos, supra note 1, at 271, 272. 
6.  Edward J. Walsh, Resource Mobilization and Citizen Protest in Communities Around Three Mile 
Island, 29 SOC. PROBS. 1, 18 (1981). 
7.  William A. Gamson & Andre Modigliani, Media Discourse and Public Opinion on Nuclear 
Power: A Constructionist Approach, 95 AMER. J. SOC. 1, 4, 21 (1989). 
8.  Evelyn O. Talbott et al., Long-Term Follow-Up of the Residents of the Three Mile Island Accident 
Area: 1979-1998, 111 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 341, 341 (2003); Steve Wing et al., A Reevaluation 
of Cancer Incidence Near the Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant: The Collision of Evidence and 
Assumptions, 105 ENVIR. HEALTH PERSP. 52, 52 (1997). 
9.  Doug Brugge, Jamie L. deLemos & Cat Bui, The Sequoyah Corporation Fuels Release and the 
Church Rock Spill: Unpublicized Nuclear Releases in American Indian Communities, 97 AMER. J. 
PUB. HEALTH 1595, 1595 (2007). See also ROBERT GOTTLIEB, FORCING THE SPRING: THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 325 (rev. & updated ed. 
2005). 
10.  Drahos, supra note 1, at 272. 
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particularly in the field of law. For all of these reasons, I take acts of 
interpretation to be of profound importance to politics. But that does not mean 
that ideas or frames are easily wielded as political tools. Frames are difficult to 
control not only because utterances can misfire, in the Austinian sense,11 but 
also because frames cannot be “abstracted from the relational actions, 
networks, and group processes in which they occur.”12 Frames cannot be 
exclusively controlled the way other resources can be, because they rely on 
preexisting cultural repertoires and resources, and are always open to 
redeployment by others. 
Actors seeking to reinterpret their circumstances to instigate and legitimate 
collective action are thus “bounded by the field and the genres within which 
they struggle.”13 They are not fully bounded, however, because they also “have 
the creative capacity to detect contradictions or gaps in meaning, as well as 
silences where they can produce new (and possibly oppositional) meanings.”14 
This brings me to a point of difference with Okediji. We agree that A2K derives 
some of its power from its willingness to operate within the terms of the 
dominant IP discourse.15 Okediji sees this discourse as a trap, suggesting that it 
can only “legitimize the role of IP in the supply of public goods,” and that, in 
adopting it, A2K can only serve as a “counterpart” and not countermovement 
to the expansion of IP.16  I agree that these are risks, and that many 
countermovements are also counterparts, in part because of how dialogic 
framing works, especially in the field of law. A2K actors do not, however, 
simply inhabit arguments that legitimate IP. They also undermine them from 
within, for example by offering competing accounts of how creativity works, 
and of alternative mechanisms of innovation that can do better than IP to 
produce public goods.17 Although A2K often speaks in the dominant terms of 
IP law, that does not mean that it cannot also reinterpret those terms in a way 
that embodies and instigates a shift towards “cultural norms that differ in form 
and operation from those that have long characterized global IP lawmaking.”18 
 
11.  J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 16 (J.O. Urmson & Marina Sbisà eds., 2d ed. 
1975); Drahos, supra note 1, at 271. 
12.  Marc W. Steinberg, Toward a More Dialogic Analysis of Social Movement Culture, in SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS: IDENTITY, CULTURE, AND THE STATE 208, 210 (David S. Meyer, Nancy 
Whittier & Belinda Robnett eds., 2002). 
13.  Steinberg, supra note 12, at 213. 
14.  Steinberg, supra note 12, at 212. 
15.  Ruth L. Okediji, IP Essentialism and the Authority of the Firm, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 274, 
277 (2008), http://thepocketpart.org/2008/06/01/okediji.html. 
16.  Okediji, supra note 15, at 277. 
17.  Kapczynski, supra note 1, at 851-59. 
18.  Okediji, supra note 15, at 279. 
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Whether it will is a different question, and one of significant importance to 
A2K. 
This is not to say that the gravitational pull of law does not have effects. As 
Okediji notes, for example, A2K is oriented more towards the terms of IP law 
than to discourses of development.19  I take this to be, in part, a sign of the pull 
that law has exerted on this emerging mobilization.20 This leads, in turn, to 
some of the questions raised by Brown-Nagin. I share her sense that we could 
learn much from a close analysis of the participants and methods of 
engagement of the emerging A2K mobilization. I chose to set aside the issue of 
whether A2K meets one or another definition of a social movement not because 
debates over how to define social movements are inconsequential, but because 
they open into a series of questions different than those that animated my 
project. I also wished to avoid the implication that A2K is “a cohesive and 
coherent force.”21 But to accept Brown-Nagin’s invitation for a moment, I 
wonder: must it be, in order to be considered a social movement?  Social 
movements in our pervasively networked age may not take the same form as 
the social movements of the 1960s and 70s (which themselves were arguably 
full of contradictions and fractious coalitions). One of the more interesting 
possibilities posed by A2K, and contemporaneous mobilizations such as the 
“anti-globalization movement,” is that the nature of social mobilization may be 
changing, and the requirements of successful mobilization along with it.22 
So I fully agree that studying the contours of A2K might provide us with 
insight into many important questions. As Brown-Nagin and Okediji both 
rightly point out, we should attend to the role of elites and groups from the 
North in A2K, in part to address important questions about the nature and 
limits of organizing around technocratic and transnational issues. Moreover, I 
would urge special attention to the role that technology plays in the strategies 
and mobilization of A2K, and in who comes to constitute the center of A2K, 
especially because, as Brown-Nagin notes, most people in the world have little 
or no access to many of the technologies through and about which A2K is 
organizing.23 Just as interesting are questions about the role that law might 
 
19.  Okediji, supra note 15, at 274. 
20.  Kapczynski, supra note 1, at 865-66. 
21.  Tomiko Brown-Nagin, “One of These Things Does Not Belong”: Intellectual Property and 
Collective Action Across Boundaries, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 280, 282 (2008), 
http://thepocketpart.org/ 2008/06/01/brown-nagin.html. 
22.  For an argument along these lines, that urges A2K not to seek convergence or “grand 
theories,” but instead engage in a “lively process of social hybridisation,” see Convergence 
Zone?, SEEDLING, Oct. 2005, at 3, 9, available at http://www.grain.org/seedling_files/seed-
05-10.pdf. 
23.  Brown-Nagin, supra note 21, at 286. 
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play in mediating the structure and dynamics of the movement.24  These issues 
matter, as Brown-Nagin suggests, in determining who has “strategic priority” 
in A2K, and which issues and tactics become central to A2K.25  Part of my 
motivation for mapping out the role that law has played in this mobilization is 
to lay the groundwork for precisely these kinds of inquiries, and to facilitate a 
critical assessment of the likely consequences of the mobilization’s current 
architecture, discourse, and strategies. Brown-Nagin is very much right that 
A2K activists are in the process of making choices about who they represent 
and what they want. These choices will necessarily be informed by theoretical 
understandings of the nature of freedom and justice in the digital age. It is 
critical engagement with these questions that I hope to facilitate in future 
work. 
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24.  Kapczynski, supra note 1, at 876. 
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